

CSUS / CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE

2025 Special Election Survey

Full Research Report

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California State University, Sacramento (CSUS)

In Partnership with the California Office of the Secretary of State

Field Period: April 16 – May 10, 2026 | $n = 1,357$ | $MoE: \pm 2.7$ pts

May 2026

Introduction: Study Overview and Methodology

The 2026 California Statewide Special Election Poll was conducted by Dr. Christopher Towler (Principal Investigator) in partnership with the California Office of the Secretary of State. The survey was fielded between April 16 and May 10, 2026, and is designed to examine voter behavior, perceptions of the electoral process, and barriers to civic participation among California residents.

The survey covers more than 100 distinct variables organized into thematic modules: voting behavior and method; voting barriers and conditions; political resources, participation, and trust; economic anxiety and living standards; media trust and election information sources; civic knowledge and voter confidence; and standard demographics. The study is explicitly designed as a multi-racial/ethnic analysis, with oversamples of Black California residents and Spanish-language survey takers to ensure adequate representation for subgroup analysis.

Table 1. Survey Statistics and Parameters

Survey Parameter	Detail
Total Respondents	1,357
Field Period	April 16 – May 10, 2026
Margin of Error	±2.7 percentage points (95% confidence)
Voters (reported)	934 (68.8% of total sample; 72% weighted)
Non-Voters	360 (26.5% of total sample; 22% weighted)
Special Oversamples	Black CA residents; Spanish-language respondents
Weighting	Required for population-level inference

Among reported voters, the most common voting method was mail-in balloting (45%), followed by drop box return (25%), in-person at a local polling place on Election Day (10%), in-person at an official vote center on Election Day (8%), in-person at an official vote center (7%), and early voting prior to Election Day (4%). These figures are central context for interpreting voting-barrier findings throughout the report.¹

Voter Participation and Voting Method: Overall Turnout

¹ This report synthesizes findings from the preliminary summary document and from the full crosstabulation file. Unless otherwise noted, all percentages reflect weighted estimates from the final dataset. Observed differences across subgroups are described as “notable” where they exceed roughly 8–10 percentage points, and as “stark” where differences are 20 or more points. The six voting method categories are defined as follows: (1) Mail-in ballot — voter returned their ballot via U.S. mail; (2) Drop box — voter deposited their mail ballot in an official county drop box; (3) In-person at a local polling place on Election Day — voter cast a ballot at an assigned neighborhood polling location; (4) In-person at an official vote center on Election Day — voter cast a ballot at a county vote center, which accepts voters from anywhere in the county; (5) In-person at an official vote center prior to Election Day — voter used an early in-person option at a vote center during the early voting window; and (6) Early voting prior to Election Day — voter cast an early ballot at a designated early voting location. Categories (2) through (6) all involve Vote By Mail (VBM) ballots returned in person or in-person voting options; only category (1) involves postal return of a VBM ballot.

Seventy-two percent of weighted respondents reported casting a ballot in the 2025 California Special Election, while 22% did not vote. Turnout rates varied substantially across demographic groups, establishing important context for subsequent findings on barriers and attitudes.²

Table 2. Turnout by Race/Ethnicity

Racial/Ethnic Group	Voted	Did Not Vote
White	80%	14%
Black	77%	21%
Hispanic/Latino	66%	26%
Asian	67%	29%
Other	73%	22%

Note: Total percentages may not add up to 100% due to respondents choosing not to answer

White respondents reported the highest turnout (80%), followed by Black respondents (77%), with Hispanic and Asian respondents approximately 10–13 points lower (66% and 67%, respectively). The gap between White and Hispanic respondents — a consistent and well-documented pattern in California electoral research — is confirmed here at 14 percentage points. This differential persists even after controlling for the age skew in the sample.

Turnout by Education and Party ID

Education is among the strongest predictors of turnout in this dataset: 88% of post-graduate respondents voted, compared with 64% of those with a high school diploma or less — a 24-point gap. Party identification also matters substantially: Independents were dramatically less likely to vote (46%) than Democrats (79%) or Republicans (81%).

Voting Method by Race/Ethnicity

The data reveal meaningful differences in how racial and ethnic groups cast their ballots. Black respondents were the most likely to mail in their ballot (53%), roughly 10 points higher than White and Hispanic respondents. Drop box usage was notably lower among Black (17%) and Hispanic (19%) voters than among White (29%) and Asian (30%) voters. In-person voting at local polling places was most common among Hispanic respondents (13%) and least common among Asian respondents (6%). These differences in voting method are relevant for understanding differential exposure to certain voting barriers described in Section 4.³

² It is important to note that turnout figures reported throughout this survey reflect self-reported voting among registered voters — not turnout calculated as a share of the total voting-age population (VAP). Because this survey sampled from the registered voter frame, reported turnout rates will be substantially higher than VAP-based measures published by external sources (e.g., BISG estimates). Comparisons with externally reported turnout figures should account for this methodological distinction.

³ The voting methods listed in Table 3 do not sum to 100% across all racial/ethnic groups. A portion of respondents who reported voting did not answer the voting method question or selected "Don't know." These non-responses have been excluded from the percentage calculations, which accounts for the missing

Table 3. Voting Method by Race/Ethnicity

Voting Method	White	Black	Hispanic	Asian
Mailed in ballot	43%	53%	43%	49%
Drop box	29%	17%	19%	30%
In-person (local polling place)	9%	12%	13%	6%
In-person (official vote center)	7%	9%	12%	3%
In-person (early voting)	4%	1%	5%	4%
Returned ballot to vote center (Election Day)	8%	8%	7%	8%

By party identification, Democrats were far more likely to vote by mail (55%) than Republicans (27%), who were substantially more likely to vote in-person on Election Day at a local polling place (14%) or a vote center (12%) than Democrats (7% and 5%, respectively). These patterns reflect well-documented partisan sorting around voting methods.

Institutional Trust: Federal vs. State. Government

One of the most striking aggregate findings in the dataset is the gap between trust in the federal government and trust in the California state government. Respondents were asked how much of the time they trust each level of government “to do what is right.”

Table 4. Institutional Trust at the Federal and State Government Level

Trust Level	Federal Government	California State Gov.
Just about always + Most of the time	22%	41%
Only some of the time	43%	29%
None of the time	24%	21%

Californians express nearly twice the level of consistent trust in their state government as in the federal government. Nearly two-thirds (67%) trust the federal government only sometimes or never, compared with roughly half (50%) for the state. This pattern has direct implications for election communications strategy: state and county officials are operating from a position of substantially higher credibility than their federal counterparts.

Trust by Race/Ethnicity: Federal Government

Across racial/ethnic groups, distrust of the federal government is widespread, but the specific levels reveal some meaningful variation. Asian respondents show the lowest rate of consistent federal trust (15%) and the highest rate of outright distrust (30%). Black respondents also express elevated distrust (28% “none of the time”). Hispanic respondents

remainder. The five categories shown (mailed ballot, drop box, in-person at local polling place, in-person at official vote center, and early in-person voting) represent the full range of response options offered.

show relatively higher consistent trust (26%) among the groups analyzed, though a majority still trust the federal government only sometimes or never. White respondents are most moderate in their distrust.

Table 5. Institutional Trust in the Federal Government, by Race/Ethnicity

Group	Always/Most of Time (Federal)	None of the Time (Federal)
White	20%	21%
Black	23%	28%
Hispanic	26%	23%
Asian	15%	30%

Trust by Race/Ethnicity: California State Government

Trust in the California state government differs more substantially across racial groups. Black respondents show the highest combined rate of consistent state trust (51%), and the lowest rate of complete distrust (11%) — a noteworthy finding given that Black respondents also expressed high federal distrust. This suggests Black Californians have relatively high confidence in their state government, specifically. White respondents also express high state trust (46%), while Asian respondents show the lowest state trust among major groups (33%), and they also expressed the lowest federal trust. Hispanic respondents fall in the middle at 40%.

Table 6. Institutional Trust in the State Government, by Race/Ethnicity

Group	Always/Most of Time (State)	None of the Time (State)
White	46%	23%
Black	51%	11%
Hispanic	40%	20%
Asian	33%	16%

Trust by Party Identification

Party identification produces the sharpest divisions on state government trust: 59% of Democrats trust the state government always or most of the time, compared with just 24% of Republicans and 21% of Independents. For the federal government, Republicans are more likely to express consistent trust (38%) than Democrats (16%) or Independents (15%), reflecting partisan alignment with the current administration in Washington.

Very conservative respondents show 60% distrust in state government (“none of the time”), the highest of any ideological group, while very liberal respondents show only 5% at that level. The inverse is roughly true for federal trust, though the differences are less extreme.

Confidence in Specific State Institutions

The survey also measured confidence in specific California institutions on a 0–10 scale. The California Governor and California Supreme Court commanded the highest confidence ratings, while the California State Legislature received slightly lower marks. Federal institutions — Congress, the President, and the U.S. Supreme Court — received substantially lower confidence scores overall, consistent with the general trust findings described above. These patterns were broadly consistent across racial/ethnic groups, though Asian respondents showed somewhat lower confidence in California institutions than did Black or White respondents.

Voting Barriers and Conditions

Voters were asked to indicate whether seven specific conditions described their experience voting in the 2025 Special Election. Across all seven conditions, majorities disagreed that they encountered a barrier. However, the minority who did report barriers represents significant pockets of concern, particularly when disaggregated by race/ethnicity.

Table 7. Voting Barriers and Conditions

Barrier	Agree (any)	Disagree (any)
Photo ID required	28%	63%
Traveled more than 1 mile to polls	28%	65%
Had to take time from work to vote	21%	75%
Waited more than 30 minutes in line	18%	74%
Found VBM process confusing	15%	82%
Had difficulty locating a drop box	13%	82%
Showed up but was told ineligible	10%	84%

Photo ID requirements and travel distance tied as the most commonly reported barriers. Importantly, California does not require voters to present photo ID under normal circumstances — meaning the 28% who agreed they “needed to present a form of photo identification” may have experienced this as a barrier either at specific vote center check-in processes, or may have misunderstood the legal requirements, or may have been asked inappropriately. This finding warrants investigation.

Photo ID Barrier by Race/Ethnicity

The racial disparities in reported photo ID experiences are striking. Black respondents reported requiring photo ID at nearly twice the rate of White respondents (36% vs. 21%), and Hispanic respondents reported it at 32%.⁴ These differences may reflect differential experiences at vote centers, differential engagement with provisional ballot processes, or

⁴ As the number of respondents who reported a racial identity as other than the four displayed on the charts is extremely small (N<100), the results for “Other” racial group identity is not included in the tables.

broader experiences with identification requirements at the poll site. *Notably, despite California not currently having any voter ID law in place, Black and Hispanic voters reported photo ID as a barrier at substantially higher rates than White voters.* Given that California does not require photo ID under standard law, investigating why these groups are disproportionately reporting this experience is a critical research and policy priority.⁵

Table 8. Voting Barriers, by Race/Ethnicity

Group	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Total Agree
White	9%	12%	21%
Black	20%	16%	36%
Hispanic	18%	14%	32%
Asian	8%	6%	14%

Travel Distance and Work Schedule Barriers by Race/Ethnicity

Travel distance barriers are distributed more evenly across racial groups than photo ID barriers, though Hispanic and Black respondents still report slightly higher rates (33% and 31% respectively vs. 27% for White and 25% for Asian respondents). By ideology, conservative respondents were notably more likely to report travel distance as a barrier (40%+ agree for very conservative) compared with very liberal respondents (30%), potentially reflecting the geographic distribution of conservative voters in more rural areas.

Table 9. Travel Distance, by Race/Ethnicity

Group	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Total Agree
White	12%	15%	27%
Black	14%	17%	31%
Hispanic	15%	18%	33%
Asian	12%	13%	25%

Taking time from work to vote was reported as a barrier by 26% of both Black and Hispanic respondents, compared with 18% of White respondents and just 11% of Asian respondents. Younger respondents (18–44) reported this barrier at substantially higher rates (43% agree) than older respondents (65+: 5% agree), likely reflecting employment patterns.

⁵ The survey does not include a direct measure of first-time voter status in the 2025 Special Election. However, cross-tabulations by age and prior voting history available in the full dataset may be used to approximate this population. Future survey waves should include an explicit first-time voter screener to permit more targeted analysis of this barrier among voters new to the electoral process.

Table 10. Work Schedule as a Barrier, by Race/Ethnicity

Group	Total Agree (Work Schedule)
White	18%
Black	26%
Hispanic	26%
Asian	11%

Vote By Mail (VBM) Process and Drop Box: Surprisingly Similar Across Groups

Two barriers showed surprisingly little variation across racial/ethnic groups: finding the VBM process confusing (ranging from 13% agree among White respondents to 20% among Black respondents) and having difficulty locating a drop box (a narrow range across groups). This relative consistency is noteworthy given the differences seen on other barriers, and suggests that VBM usability and drop box accessibility may be relatively equitable concerns rather than racially concentrated ones.

Voter Eligibility / Turned Away at Polls

Nine percent of the overall sample agreed they had shown up to vote but been told they were not registered or ineligible. The racial breakdown shows a more pronounced disparity. Black respondents reported being told they were ineligible at three times the rate of White respondents (16% vs. 5%). Hispanic respondents also reported elevated rates (11%). Though these are relatively small absolute numbers, the racial disparity is severe and warrants close investigation. These rates could reflect issues with voter registration maintenance, differential provisional ballot experiences, or other barriers in the process.

Table 11. Reported Being Told Ineligible, by Race/Ethnicity

Group	Total Agree (Turned Away/Ineligible)
White	5%
Black	16%
Hispanic	11%
Asian	3%

Ballot-Counting Voting Process Concerns: A Paradox

One of the most analytically striking findings in the dataset is the coexistence of general process confidence and specific ballot-counting anxiety. Roughly 63% of respondents expressed at least some confidence in the voting process (extremely + somewhat confident). Yet simultaneously, half of respondents (50%) expressed at least some concern that their ballot might not be counted, with 14% describing themselves as “very concerned.” This leaves us with a Confidence Paradox: *Californians can simultaneously believe the voting process is broadly trustworthy and worry that their specific ballot may not be counted. These are not contradictory beliefs — they reflect distinct levels of analysis (systemic confidence*

*vs. personal anxiety) — but the tension between them is a prime target for targeted communications.*⁶

Ballot-Counting Concern by Race/Ethnicity

Hispanic respondents show the highest ballot-counting anxiety, with 18% very concerned and only 33% not concerned at all — versus 49% of White respondents who expressed no concern. Black and Asian respondents fall in between. The gap between White and Hispanic respondents (49% vs. 33% not concerned) is 16 percentage points. This differential is consistent with broader patterns of lower institutional trust and higher reported barrier exposure among Hispanic respondents.⁷

Table 12. Ballot-Counting Concern, by Race/Ethnicity

Group	Very Concerned	Somewhat/Little Concerned	Not Concerned
White	10%	34%	49%
Black	14%	36%	45%
Hispanic	18%	40%	33%
Asian	14%	31%	44%

Voting Process Confidence by Race/Ethnicity

Notably, overall confidence levels are relatively consistent across racial groups — ranging from 60% (Asian) to 68% (Black) — suggesting that general process confidence does not vary dramatically by race. However, the mode of confidence differs: Black respondents are more likely to fall in the “somewhat confident” category rather than “extremely confident,” suggesting a softer rather than rock-solid confidence. White respondents show the highest rate of “extremely confident” (36%).

⁶ This finding is broadly consistent with results from the 2023 CSUS/SOS study, in which approximately 40% of respondents expressed at least some concern that their ballot might not be counted. The persistence of this anxiety across two survey cycles — even as overall process confidence has remained relatively stable — suggests that ballot-counting concern reflects a durable psychological orientation rather than a reaction to specific electoral events.

⁷ An exploratory cross-tabulation of ballot-counting concern by primary voting method (mail-in vs. in-person) suggests that anxiety is modestly elevated among mail ballot users compared to in-person voters. This may reflect concerns about USPS delivery reliability or uncertainty about whether a returned mail ballot was received and processed, rather than concerns about counting accuracy per se.

Table 13. Voting Process Confidence, by Race/Ethnicity

Group	Extremely Confident	Somewhat Confident	Total Confident
White	36%	28%	64%
Black	30%	38%	68%
Hispanic	27%	35%	62%
Asian	28%	32%	60%

Confidence by Party and Ideology

Party affiliation produces the sharpest divisions in voting process confidence. Democrats express the highest confidence (83% confident overall), while Independents show significantly lower confidence (42% confident). Republicans fall in the middle (53%). On the ideological spectrum, very liberal respondents are the most confident (83%) and very conservative respondents are the least (49%). This pattern is consistent with the partisan narratives around election integrity that have dominated national political discourse.

Media Trust and Election Information Sources

Respondents were asked how much they trust eight different information sources for accuracy. A clear hierarchy emerged, with official communications from state and county election offices most trusted and social media least trusted. Official election communications lead all sources by a significant margin. This is a strategically important finding for the Secretary of State's communications planning: the office occupies the position of greatest public credibility, above media institutions, community leaders, and social platforms.

Table 14. Media Trust (Most to least trustful)

Source	Great Deal/Fair Amount Trust
Official state/county election communications	48%
Trusted community leaders/organizations	39%
Television	36%
Email messages or notices	35%
Online/internet	32%
Newspapers	30%
Radio/podcasts	26%
Social media	22%

Social Media Trust and Official Election Communications by Race/Ethnicity

Black respondents show substantially higher social media trust (17% great deal) compared to White respondents (4%). This is not simply a reflection of general trustworthiness — Black respondents showed high trust in official communications as well. Rather, it likely reflects that social networks and community media play a more central role in the flow of information

for Black Californians. Social media trust among Hispanic respondents (10%) is also above the White level. This has implications for targeted outreach strategy: social media channels may be more effective for reaching Black and Hispanic audiences than the overall trust rankings would suggest.

Table 15. Social Media Trust, by Race/Ethnicity

Group	Great Deal Trust (Social Media)	Not Much/Not at All Trust
White	4%	52%
Black	17%	35%
Hispanic	10%	38%
Asian	6%	41%
Other*	3%	74%

*Less than 100 participants reported their race as something “Other” than one of the four categories identified, so these results are far from generalizable.

Trust in official election communications is consistently high across all racial/ethnic groups, ranging from 47% to 53%. This is one of the most uniform findings in the dataset — and one of the most actionable. Regardless of group, voters consistently identify state and county election offices as their most trusted information sources. Black respondents show the highest rate of trust in official communications, reinforcing the earlier finding on state government trust.

Table 16. Trust in Official Election Communications, by Race/Ethnicity

Group	Great Deal/Fair Amount Trust (Official Comms)
White	47%
Black	53%
Hispanic	47%
Asian	50%
Other*	49%

*Less than 100 participants reported their race as something “Other” than one of the four categories identified, so these results are far from generalizable.

Community Leaders by Race/Ethnicity

Trust in community leaders and organizations shows some variation across groups, with Black respondents slightly more likely to trust community leaders a great deal (16%) versus White respondents (11%). Party identification also shapes this: 43% of self-identified Liberals and 34% of Democrats express great or fair trust in community leaders, compared with 35% of Conservatives.

Election Information Sources: What Do Voters Actually Use?

Respondents were asked to rank their top three sources for election information. Among those who cited official election communications as a top source, nearly 85% voted in the

2025 election. Television, online sources, and official communications were among the most commonly ranked top sources. Social media ranked first for about 12% of respondents, but was associated with lower turnout rates. These findings reinforce the strategic value of investing in direct official communications outreach while also engaging social platforms for hard-to-reach groups.⁸

Voting Rights: Attitudes Toward Electoral Policies

Respondents rated their support for five voting access policies on a 0–10 scale (0 = strongly oppose, 10 = strongly support). Support levels are generally high across the board. The majority of Californians express strong support for all five access policies measured. Early voting and vote by mail received the highest levels of strong support, consistent with how the majority of California voters already cast their ballots. Election Day as a national holiday also commands a strong majority of support.

Table 17. Support for Voting Rights Electoral Policies

Policy	High Support (8-10)	Low Support (0-2)
Election Day as a national holiday	51%	16%
Automatic voter registration	~52%	~13%
Same-day registration	41%	19%
Vote by mail	~52%	~12%
Early voting	~55%	~11%

Voting Rights Attitudes by Race/Ethnicity: Notable Similarities

Across most voting access policies, racial/ethnic groups show broadly similar distributions of support. For example, on Election Day as a national holiday, strong support (8–10) ranges from 44% (Other) to 54% (White), with Black and Hispanic respondents at 49% each — a relatively narrow band. This is one of the more surprising “no-difference” findings in the dataset: despite significantly different barrier experiences and levels of institutional trust, racial/ethnic groups are closely aligned on the question of voting rights policies.

The starkest group differences on voting access attitudes emerge by party identification, not race. Republicans are nearly three times as likely to oppose same-day registration (37% score 0–2) as Democrats (6%), and roughly 45% of Republicans oppose automatic voter registration, versus only 9% of Democrats. These partisan divides dwarf racial/ethnic differences on these questions and reflect the nationalized nature of the debate about voting access.

⁸ It is important to distinguish between media trust (Table 14) and media use as a top information source (this section). The trust rankings show that official election communications are rated most credible, while social media is rated least credible. The use rankings, however, show that television, online sources, official communications, and social media are among the most commonly cited top-three sources — meaning that some voters rely heavily on sources they rate as relatively less trustworthy. This gap between trust and use has implications for outreach: communications strategy should account for where voters actually encounter information, not only where they say they would prefer to receive it.

Forward-Looking: Intentions to Vote in 2026

The survey was conducted during the lead-up to both the 2026 primary elections (June 2) and the 2026 midterm elections. Respondents who voted in the 2025 Special Election expressed substantially higher intention to vote in 2026 (94% definitely will vote in the midterms) than those who did not vote in 2025 (5% definitely will vote in the midterms).

Hispanic and Asian respondents show lower rates of definite midterm intention (59% each) compared with White (75%) and Black (68%) respondents. Asian respondents show an unexpectedly high rate of “definitely will not vote” (15%) despite moderate overall turnout in 2025. The gap between White and Hispanic respondents in definite voting intention (75% vs. 59%) mirrors the 2025 turnout gap and suggests that structural and motivational barriers persist beyond individual elections.

Table 18. Intention to Vote in 2026 Midterm Elections, by Race/Ethnicity

Group	Definitely Will Vote (Midterms)	Definitely Will Not Vote
White	75%	6%
Black	68%	5%
Hispanic	59%	9%
Asian	59%	15%

Note: Less than 100 participants reported their race as something “Other” than one of the four categories identified, so these results are not displayed.

Trust, Confidence, and Future Voting

Among respondents who expressed no concern about their ballot being counted, 94% who voted in 2025 say they will definitely vote in 2026. Among those who were very concerned their ballot was not counted, the definite 2026 vote intention drops to 84% among previous voters. While this gap is not enormous, it suggests that ballot-counting anxiety has at least a modest suppressive effect on forward-looking engagement.

Higher state government trust is robustly associated with a higher likelihood of voting in 2026. Among those who trust the state government always or most of the time, 83% say they will definitely vote in the midterms. Among those who trust the state government none of the time, only 63% say they will definitely vote.

Understanding Non-Voters

Of the 22% who reported not voting in the 2025 Special Election, the most common reasons for not voting centered on information gaps and practical barriers. Respondents who did not vote were more likely to be younger (18–44), Hispanic, Asian, have lower education levels, and identify as Independent. Non-voters were also substantially more economically anxious and more likely to have experienced material hardship.

Information Gaps as a Barrier to Non-Voting

Among non-voters, a meaningful segment cited not receiving enough information as a factor in their non-participation (17% to 22% gave this a high importance score of 8–10). Importantly, White non-voters cited information gaps at lower rates (around 9% at high importance) than Black (19%) or Hispanic (22%) non-voters, suggesting that information access and clarity may be differentially reaching communities of color.⁹

Making a Statement/Protest Non-Voting

A notable share of non-voters indicated that their decision was deliberate — choosing not to vote as a form of protest or to “make a statement.” This was especially pronounced among younger non-voters (18–29). This finding suggests that some portion of non-participation is not primarily a function of access barriers, but of civic alienation or deliberate disengagement. Outreach strategies targeting this group will need to address motivational rather than logistical barriers.¹⁰

Ineligibility as a Non-Voting Factor

A portion of non-voters cited ineligibility (not being registered or not meeting requirements) as a reason for not voting. Hispanic non-voters were more likely to indicate this as a factor than other groups. Future survey waves should include more granular probing of the types of ineligibility respondents experienced, as this has direct implications for voter registration outreach and access programs.¹¹

Race, Equity, and Voting Behavior

So far, research report documents significant racial and ethnic disparities across a range of survey measures — from voting barriers and ballot-counting anxiety to institutional trust, material hardship, and media preferences. The final analysis that follows takes those disparities a step further by examining how each of the key disparity findings connects to the two core voting behavior outcomes measured in the survey: participation in the 2025 Special Elections and potential participation in the 2026 Midterm Election.

⁹ These data suggest that existing voter information infrastructure is reaching white communities at higher rates than Black and Hispanic communities. This is not necessarily a reflection of insufficient effort on the part of the Secretary of State's office, but may reflect structural factors including differential exposure to traditional information channels, language barriers, and lower baseline trust in institutional communications. Targeted, culturally competent information campaigns through trusted community channels may be necessary to close this gap.

¹⁰ It is worth noting that protest non-voting — choosing not to vote as a deliberate act of dissent — reflects a political rather than administrative failure. While the Secretary of State's office can work to reduce logistical barriers and improve information access, motivational disengagement rooted in dissatisfaction with candidates or parties may be more appropriately addressed through civic engagement efforts and political parties than through election administration reform alone.

¹¹ The survey does not directly ask respondents whether they have a prior incarceration history. However, formerly incarcerated individuals represent a meaningful component of California's non-voter population, as restoration of voting rights upon release from state prison has only been in effect since 2020. The elevated rates of reported ineligibility among Hispanic non-voters in particular may partly reflect this population, though this cannot be confirmed with the current data. Future survey waves should consider including a screener item on prior criminal justice involvement to permit more targeted outreach analysis.

Before examining the connections between specific attitudes and voting, it is essential to establish the turnout baseline. These gaps define the landscape against which all subsequent findings must be interpreted. According to Table 19, White respondents lead in both 2025 turnout (80%) and 2026 definite vote intention (75%). Black respondents follow at 77%/68%. Hispanic and Asian respondents report the lowest turnout (66–67%) and lowest definite 2026 intention (59% each). The 14-point gap between White and Hispanic respondents is consistent across both electoral cycles. Asian respondents show an additionally concerning pattern: 15% say they definitely will not vote in the 2026 midterms — the highest definite abstention rate of any group.

Table 19. Voter Turnout, by Race/Ethnicity

Racial/Ethnic Group	Voted in 2025 Special Election	Did NOT Vote	Def. Will Vote in 2026
White	80%	14%	75%
Black	77%	21%	68%
Hispanic/Latino	66%	26%	59%
Asian	67%	29%	59%
Total (weighted)	72%	22%	65%

Note: Less than 100 participants reported their race as something “Other” than one of the four categories identified, so these results are not displayed.

The White–Hispanic turnout gap (14 points in 2025, 16 points in definite 2026 intention) is the single largest sustained disparity in voting behavior. Every analysis below must be read against this backdrop: the groups that face the most concentrated barriers are precisely the groups already showing the lowest turnout.

Photo ID Barrier → 2026 Vote Intention (Among 2025 Voters)

As previously explained, Black and Hispanic voters reported photo ID experiences at 36% and 32%, respectively — roughly 11–15 points above White voters. Asian voters reported the lowest rate (14%). The disparity between Black and White voters is a 15-point gap; between Hispanic and White, it is 11 points. The connection between the photo ID barrier and 2026 vote intention is striking. Among voters who strongly agreed they had to present photo ID, 28% say they will definitely not vote in 2026 — a rate roughly 4 to 5 times higher than among those who strongly disagreed (7%). Voters who experienced the photo ID barrier also show notably lower rates of definite 2026 intent (13%) versus those who did not (64% among those who strongly disagree). Those who “somewhat agreed” show elevated hesitancy too, with only 8% definitively intending to vote again.

Table 20. Photo ID Response, by 2026 Voter Turnout (Among 2025 Voters)

Photo ID Response	Def. Will Vote 2026	Prob. Will Vote	Maybe/Def. Will Not
Strongly agree (13%)	13% definitely	10% probably	28% def. will not
Somewhat agree (12%)	8%	34%	31%
Somewhat disagree (6%)	5%	15%	3%
Strongly disagree (58%)	64%	31%	7%

To summarize, Black and Hispanic voters report the photo ID barrier at the highest rates (36% and 32%). Voters who experienced this barrier show significantly depressed future vote intention. Given the racial concentration of this barrier, it represents a compounding suppression mechanism: the same groups with the lowest turnout baseline are disproportionately experiencing the condition most associated with future disengagement.

Photo ID Barrier and Region

The regional breakdown on the photo ID barrier reveals one region that is a clear outlier: Southern California, or **Los Angeles**. Thirty-five percent of LA voters agreed they needed to present photo ID — nearly double the rates in the Bay Area (18%), Central region (19%), or the Superior/Northern region (20%). This means the photo ID disparity is not evenly distributed across California — it is disproportionately concentrated in Southern California, particularly in Los Angeles County.¹²¹³

Furthermore, Los Angeles is California's most racially diverse region, with large Black and Hispanic voting populations — the same groups already reporting the highest photo ID barrier rates statewide. The regional concentration in LA likely reflects and amplifies the racial disparities documented elsewhere in the data, suggesting that Black and Hispanic voters in LA are probably driving much of the elevated statewide figure for those groups.

If the photo ID barrier is substantially a Los Angeles County problem, that is actually useful information: it narrows the investigative and remediation target considerably. An audit of poll-site and vote center practices in LA County — whether ID is being requested inappropriately, under what circumstances, and at which types of locations — could identify the source of the disparity and allow for targeted corrective action rather than statewide policy changes.

¹² The current dataset does not include a variable distinguishing Vote Center Act (VCA) counties — where voters may use any vote center in the county — from traditional polling-place counties. This distinction is analytically relevant for interpreting the travel distance barrier, since VCA voters have considerably more flexibility in where they vote and may be less affected by proximity. A VCA/polling-place county breakdown is identified as a priority analysis for the full report and should be incorporated in the cross-tabulation file for subsequent waves.

¹³ The LA region is also the highest-barrier region for wait times (26% agree with 30+ min. waits vs. a statewide average of 14%) and for being turned away or told ineligible (11% agree vs. 9% statewide). This suggests LA is not just an outlier on photo ID specifically but rather has a consistently more difficult voting environment than other regions — a convergence of multiple barriers that likely has a compounding suppressive effect on participation.

Voter Eligibility / Turned Away → Voting Behavior

In this case, asked whether voters had “showed up to vote but were told they were not registered or ineligible.” While the aggregate rate is relatively low (9% in total agreement), the racial disparities are among the most severe in the entire dataset. Earlier, it was reported that Black respondents reported being turned away as ineligible at three times the rate of White respondents (16% vs. 5%). Hispanic respondents reported it at twice the White rate (11%). This is the most racially disparate barrier in the entire survey among those already in the voter pool, as this question was only asked of 2025 voters (n=934).

Among the small but meaningful group who strongly agreed they were turned away or told they were ineligible, 46% say they will definitely not vote in 2026 — by far the highest abstention intent in any barrier question. Only 3% of this group say they will definitely vote in 2026, compared with 84% of those who had no such experience. This is the most extreme barrier-to-disengagement relationship in the dataset.

Table 21. Turned Away at Polls by 2026 Voter Turnout (Among 2025 Voters)

Turned Away Response	Def. Will Vote 2026	Maybe/Def. Will Not
Strongly agree (3%)	3%	46% def. will not
Somewhat agree (4%)	3%	11%
Somewhat disagree (6%)	4%	15%
Strongly disagree (80%)	84%	8%

Black voters experience this barrier at three times the White rate. Voters who experienced it show near-total disengagement from future participation. The combination of high racial concentration and devastating impact on future intent makes this the single most urgent barrier to investigate and remediate. Even small absolute reductions in the frequency of this experience among Black and Hispanic voters could meaningfully close the participation gap.¹⁴

Wait Time and Work Schedule Barriers

In addition, the survey asked whether voters had “waited in line longer than 30 minutes at a polling location.” Overall, 14% of voters agreed, with meaningful racial variation. Black voters experienced long wait times at three times the rate of White voters (27% vs. 9%), and Hispanic voters at more than double (22% vs. 9%). Asian voters were least affected (7%). This racial disparity in poll-site wait times is consistent with documented patterns of polling place closures and resource allocation in minority-majority precincts.

Interestingly, long wait times show a less dramatic relationship to future vote intention than photo ID or being turned away. Those who experienced a 30+ minute wait showed only

¹⁴ Despite the elevated barrier rates, LA's 2025 Special Election turnout (72%) is essentially at the statewide average. This could mean that LA voters are highly motivated enough to overcome these barriers, or that the suppressive effect is primarily operating on marginal voters who are harder to capture in a survey of this kind.

modestly depressed definite 2026 intent. This may reflect the fact that voters willing to wait in long lines are especially motivated — effectively self-selecting for high future engagement. However, the equity concern remains real: Black and Hispanic voters are bearing a disproportionate time burden to vote, which compounds scheduling barriers (see Section 5) and may suppress participation among the less highly motivated within those communities.¹⁵

Similarly, voters were also asked whether they “had to take time out of their workday to vote.” This barrier is especially relevant for hourly workers who face wage loss or schedule penalties for leaving work. The racial disparities here align directly with the turnout gaps observed. To reiterate, Black and Hispanic voters reported the work schedule barrier at 26% each, compared with just 18% for White voters and 11% for Asian voters. This 8-point gap between White and Black/Hispanic voters is consistent with the economic hardship data, where Black and Hispanic respondents also report substantially higher rates of material deprivation.

Here, data suggest that the work schedule barrier is predominantly a young-voter problem. Forty-three percent of 18–29-year-old voters reported this barrier, compared with just 5% of those 65+. Since younger voters are also disproportionately Hispanic and Black in California, the work schedule barrier represents an intersection of age and racial disadvantage. For Hispanic respondents who are both younger on average and more economically vulnerable, this is likely a compounding suppressive factor.¹⁶

Table 22. Working Day Voting Barrier, by Age Cohort (All Respondents)

Age Group	Total Agree (Work Barrier)
18–29	43%
30–44	32%
45–64	11%
65+	5%

Voting Process Confidence → Voting Behavior

The relationship between process confidence and 2026 vote intention is among the strongest in the dataset. To start, all respondents were asked how confident they are in the voting process overall. While the full-sample distribution shows 63% at least somewhat confident, the relationship between confidence and future vote intent is among the strongest in the dataset. Race produces moderate differences in process confidence: White respondents are most likely to be extremely confident (36%), while Hispanic and Asian respondents are least likely (27–28%). However, the total confidence rate (extremely + somewhat) is relatively

¹⁵ Black and Hispanic voters face substantially longer lines than White or Asian voters. While determined voters often persist through long waits, this barrier creates an unequal time cost of voting by race — one that likely has larger suppressive effects on marginal voters within those communities than the overall intention data suggest.

¹⁶ These findings suggest that an individual’s work schedule is a structural, not motivational, barrier: affected voters are not disengaged from democracy, they are constrained by employment conditions. Policies such as paid voting leave, expanded early voting, or Election Day as a federal holiday may have racially progressive effects on turnout.

consistent across groups (60–68%), making this one of the areas where racial differences are present but not stark. Party identification drives sharper differences here than race does.

The relationship between process confidence and 2026 vote intention is among the strongest in the dataset. Those with no confidence in the voting process show a 42% rate of definite non-voting in 2026, compared with 21% for the most confident. Critically, only 9% of the not-confident group say they will definitely vote, versus 42% of the extremely confident group. Confidence is not merely correlated with voting: it appears to be a prerequisite for sustained participation.¹⁷

Table 23. Process Confidence and Voter Turnout (All Respondents)

Confidence Level	Def. Will Vote 2026	Def. Will NOT Vote
Extremely confident (31%)	42%	21%
Somewhat confident (32%)	34%	14%
A little confident (17%)	15%	11%
Not confident at all (13%)	9%	42%

Priority Areas: Where Racial Disparities and Behavioral Suppression Converge

The analysis above identifies three tiers of urgency based on the combination of (a) size of racial disparity and (b) strength of association with voting suppression. To start, *being told ineligible/turned away and the photo ID barrier are the most pressing*. Among Black and Hispanic voters, 32–36% report, respectively, a photo ID as a barrier despite California law, suggesting a strong link to future non-voting. Moreover, fears of being told one is ineligible or outright turned away at the polls register the highest anxiety of any racial group, and are directly linked to future disengagement. Personal, granular reassurance messaging needed. Lastly, there is a process confidence gap for Hispanic and Asian voters; low confidence is the strongest single predictor of definite non-voting. Confidence-building communications through trusted channels critical for these groups.

Structural and Policy-Level Interventions

Structural labor and scheduling inequities drive differential voting costs, particularly the work schedule barrier for Black and Hispanic voters. Paid voting leave or expanded early voting options could close this gap. Furthermore, long wait times are a major problem for Black and Hispanic voters. Resource allocation and polling place management are equity issues that are particularly relevant for in-person voters from these communities. Lastly, material hardship among Black and Hispanic voters, namely economic insecurity,

¹⁷ While racial differences in process confidence are moderate in absolute terms, the behavioral consequences of low confidence are dramatic. Since Hispanic and Asian respondents show higher rates of low confidence, and since low confidence is strongly associated with definite non-voting, this pathway represents a meaningful indirect mechanism linking racial distrust to the turnout gap. Boosting process confidence specifically among Hispanic and Asian respondents could have outsized effects on closing the turnout gap.

suppresses 2026 vote intent. Civic engagement embedded in economic support services may reach the most at-risk non-voters.¹⁸

Noteworthy Findings Beyond Race/Ethnicity

The following outlines noteworthy findings in the study that encompass differences in political attitudes and behavior due to various other factors, such as age, education, party identification, region, language, housing status, and economic vulnerability.

Age: A Dominant Cross-Cutting Variable

Age is among the strongest predictors of nearly every attitude and behavior measured in this survey:

- Turnout: 85% of respondents 65+ voted, compared to 63% of 18–29-year-olds — a 22-point gap.
- Ballot-counting concern: younger respondents (18–29) are more likely to be somewhat or very concerned about ballot counting (47%) than older respondents (65+: 22%).
- VBM confusion: 36% of 18–29-year-olds agreed they found the VBM process confusing, versus only 3% of those 65+.
- Working-day barrier: 43% of 18–29-year-olds agreed they had to take time from work to vote, versus 5% of those 65+ — a 38-point gap.
- Federal trust: younger respondents (18–29) show higher federal trust than older ones, with 37% trusting the federal government always or most of the time versus 15% of those 65+.
- Voting method: 46% of 18–29-year-olds voted in person, compared with about 21% of those 65+.

These patterns collectively suggest that younger voters face a distinct set of logistical barriers (work schedules, VBM complexity, in-person voting dependence) that differ meaningfully from those of older voters. Youth-specific outreach programs and simplified VBM education may be high-priority interventions.

Education: Confidence and Barriers Diverge

Higher education is consistently associated with higher voter turnout, higher process confidence, and lower barrier rates — but with an important wrinkle on economic anxiety. Post-graduate respondents are the most economically anxious overall (47% very anxious about the national economy), despite having objectively higher incomes on average. This may reflect the “informed anxiety” pattern in which those with more education and media consumption are more aware of macroeconomic risks.

¹⁸ As a final note, the racial disparities and behavioral relationships shown here are directionally reliable but may be confounded by the correlation between race and other variables (income, education, age, geography). A multivariate regression analysis of the full microdata would allow precise decomposition of which factors independently drive the turnout gaps documented here — and should be a priority for the full report’s analytical phase.

Lower-educated respondents face higher material hardship but are somewhat less likely to translate that into economic anxiety, possibly due to the normalization of scarcity. The disjunction between material conditions and expressed anxiety has implications for how economic messaging should be calibrated across education groups.

Party Identification: The Sharpest Divides

Across nearly all attitudinal measures, party identification produces the sharpest cleavages in the dataset, often larger than the differences observed across race/ethnicity:

- State government trust: 59% of Democrats trust the state always/most of the time vs. 24% of Republicans.
- Process confidence: 83% of Democrats are confident in the voting process vs. 53% of Republicans.
- VBM use: 55% of Democrats voted by mail vs. 27% of Republicans.
- Ballot-counting concern: 43% of Republicans are concerned their ballot may not be counted, vs. 31% of Democrats.
- Federal trust: 38% of Republicans trust the federal government always/most of the time vs. 16% of Democrats.

These partisan divergences have direct implications for election communication design. Messages about process integrity may need to be framed differently for partisan audiences. Notably, Independents consistently show the most skeptical and disengaged profiles — lowest turnout (46% in 2025), least likely to definitely vote in 2026 (36%), highest distrust across the board — making this group an especially important target for civic engagement efforts.¹⁹

Regional Variation: Southern California versus the Bay Area

Regional patterns reveal meaningful heterogeneity across California. Southern California respondents show somewhat higher barrier rates (photo ID, wait times) compared to the Bay Area, where turnout intent is slightly higher. The Central region shows elevated economic anxiety and higher rates of VBM confusion. Los Angeles stands out for higher social media trust and higher in-person vote center usage, consistent with its urban geography and diverse demographics. Regional analysis enriches the findings but also complicates outreach planning, as optimal strategies may differ across the state's diverse geography (See Appendix for Regional Map).

Spanish-Speakers: Lower Turnout, Higher Anxiety

Respondents who chose to take the survey in Spanish — a proxy for recent immigration or lower English proficiency — reported turnout of only 52% in the 2025 Special Election, compared with 73% among English-language respondents. Spanish-language survey

¹⁹ Cross-tabulation of Independent respondents' responses to the "why not vote" battery and process confidence items suggests that Independent disengagement is driven by a combination of factors: lower process confidence, lower institutional trust, and — particularly among younger Independents — a sense that voting will not make a meaningful difference. While some portion of this reflects dissatisfaction with the available candidates (a political rather than administrative issue), a meaningful share appears to reflect structural alienation from the electoral process itself, which is more directly addressable through outreach and civic education efforts.

takers also expressed substantially higher ballot-counting anxiety and higher rates of most voting barriers. This subgroup represents a critical target population for culturally competent voter outreach, particularly given California's large Spanish-speaking population.²⁰

Housing Status and Economic Vulnerability

Renters showed systematically higher economic anxiety, higher barrier rates, and lower turnout than homeowners across the sample. Given California's high proportion of renters (especially in urban centers), this cross-cutting variable may be a useful targeting dimension for outreach — particularly because it captures economic vulnerability in a way that cuts across racial and income lines.

Overall Takeaways and Conclusions

The 2026 Special Election Survey provides a comprehensive, multi-layered portrait of California voters' attitudes, behaviors, and barriers. The following summarizes the major conclusions across the thematic areas examined in this report.

The State-Federal Trust Asymmetry Is a Major Asset for California Election Officials

Californians trust their state government at roughly twice the rate they trust the federal government. Official state and county election communications are the most trusted information source in the electorate — more trusted than television, newspapers, community leaders, or social media. This gives the Secretary of State's office, county election officials, and state-level government messengers extraordinary standing to convey accurate election information and counter misinformation. The fact that this trust advantage holds across racial groups makes it particularly valuable for broad-based outreach.

Racial Disparities in Barrier Experience Are Pronounced and Warrant Urgent Attention

The photo ID barrier disparity between White and Black respondents (21% vs. 36%) is the most alarming single finding in the dataset. Given that California does not require photo ID under standard law, the high rate at which Black and Hispanic voters reported this as part of their voting experience suggests either a compliance failure, a misunderstanding of requirements, or a differential application of ID checks at some polling locations. Similarly, Black respondents reported being turned away as ineligible at three times the rate of White respondents. These findings demand investigation beyond survey data — including administrative records analysis and on-the-ground audit approaches.

²⁰ External BISG (Bayesian Improved Surname Geocoding) estimates for the 2025 Special Election suggest Spanish-surname turnout of approximately 39.8%. This figure differs from the 52% reported here because the two measures are not directly comparable: BISG estimates capture turnout as a share of all Spanish-surname registered voters (or of VAP), while this survey's 52% figure reflects self-reported turnout among Spanish-language survey takers who completed the survey — a subset of registered voters already more engaged with civic processes than the full population. This survey's higher figure should be interpreted as a registered-voter baseline, not as a population-level turnout rate.

The Ballot-Counting Confidence Paradox Requires Targeted Response

The coexistence of general process confidence (63% confident) and ballot-counting anxiety (50% somewhat or very concerned) is an internal contradiction that the communications strategy must navigate carefully. Vague reassurances about the integrity of “the system” may not address the personal, specific anxiety that voters feel about their own ballot. Effective messaging will likely need to be granular and personal: explaining what happens to a specific voter’s ballot, from submission through counting, rather than offering broad-brush assurances.

Social Media Trust Is Higher Among Black and Hispanic Voters

While social media is the least trusted information source overall, it is significantly more trusted among Black and Hispanic respondents than among White respondents. This suggests that digital and social media outreach — particularly through trusted accounts and culturally resonant content — may be disproportionately effective for reaching these communities, even as the overall media landscape favors official communications.

Areas for Further Investigation

The following areas represent the highest-priority topics for follow-up research in a subsequent survey wave or companion study.

Racial Disparities in Voter Eligibility Experiences

The finding that Black respondents reported photo ID requirements and ineligibility notifications at dramatically higher rates than White respondents is the single most urgent finding warranting follow-up. A combination of administrative records analysis, qualitative interviews with affected voters, and a more granular survey battery on the specific circumstances of these experiences would help determine whether these reflect policy non-compliance, procedural inconsistencies, or misunderstandings about requirements.

Comprehensive Non-Voter Analysis

The 26.5% of respondents who did not vote in the 2025 Special Election have not been fully analyzed in this preliminary report. Their responses to the “why not vote” battery — including open-text responses — represent a rich dataset for understanding the motivational, informational, and structural barriers that prevented participation. Particular attention should be paid to the segment that deliberately chose not to vote as a form of protest or statement, as these individuals require fundamentally different outreach approaches than those who faced logistical barriers.²¹

²¹ Non-voters who cited motivational reasons for not participating — including deliberate protest voting and candidate dissatisfaction — represent a segment whose disengagement may be more appropriately addressed by political parties and candidates than by the Secretary of State’s office. The SOS’s most direct levers are administrative: reducing barriers, improving information access, and ensuring equitable and consistent poll-site practices. Motivational disengagement that stems from dissatisfaction with electoral choices falls outside the administrative mandate, though civic education programs that emphasize the broader impact of voting may still have some effect at the margins.

Spanish-Language Voter Outreach and Information Access

Spanish-language survey takers demonstrated dramatically lower turnout (52% vs. 73%), higher ballot-counting anxiety, and higher barrier rates across nearly every dimension measured. A dedicated analysis of this subgroup, potentially with expanded qualitative depth through focus groups or interviews, would provide actionable guidance for Spanish-language voter education and outreach programs.

The Confidence-Anxiety Paradox: Messaging Experiments

The coexistence of process confidence and ballot-counting anxiety represents an opportunity for targeted communications experimentation. A follow-up survey or field experiment should test different messaging frames — systemic vs. personal reassurance, procedural descriptions vs. endorsements from trusted community leaders — and measure their relative effectiveness at reducing ballot-counting anxiety among different subgroups, particularly Hispanic and younger voters.

Longitudinal Tracking

Perhaps most importantly, a follow-up survey conducted after the 2026 primary and midterm elections would allow the research team to (a) validate self-reported 2025 turnout against administrative records, (b) track whether voter confidence and trust shift in the context of higher-salience elections, and (c) test whether outreach interventions piloted between the Special Election and the 2026 elections produce measurable changes in barrier rates or voter knowledge. This survey provides an excellent baseline for such a longitudinal study.²²

The California Secretary of State Special Election Survey Report offers one of the most comprehensive portraits of California's electorate in recent memory — and its findings carry both reassurance and urgency in equal measure. Californians broadly trust their state government and regard official election communications as their most credible source of electoral information, giving the Secretary of State's office a foundation of public confidence that few institutions currently enjoy. Yet that foundation is unevenly distributed. Black and Hispanic Californians — the state's two largest communities of color — face a series of compounding disadvantages: higher rates of voting barriers, greater exposure to long lines and work-schedule conflicts, and higher anxiety about whether their ballots are ultimately counted. These are not isolated inconveniences; they form a coherent pattern of differential burden that tracks closely with the persistent turnout gaps documented throughout this report. The data are equally clear about the path forward: voters who trust the process participate in it, voters who receive accurate information use it, and voters who encounter barriers are more likely to disengage from future elections. Closing California's participation gaps will require simultaneous action on multiple fronts — administrative audits of poll-site

²² Additional analysis should also include a comparison of Voters Choice Act (VCA) counties with other counties in the state. To do so, a dataset needs to be designed with this comparison in mind so that county data can be representative of the VCA and non-VCA counties across the entire state.

practices, targeted and culturally resonant voter outreach, expanded access accommodations for working voters, and communications strategies that speak to personal ballot-counting anxiety rather than offering only broad systemic reassurances. The research infrastructure built through this survey — including its oversamples of underrepresented communities and its rich battery of barrier and trust measures — provides exactly the evidentiary foundation needed to design, target, and ultimately evaluate those interventions. The next step is to act on it.

Appendix: Map of Identified California Regions, by County

