

Ventura County

Canvass Activities Summary

March 3, 2020 Presidential Primary Election

Auditing of the Precincts

Each Inspector is responsible to complete a variety of forms and certifications after the close of the polls on Election Day. Elections staff then audits those forms to account for all ballots issued and returned. For the March 3, 2020 election, there were 389 precinct boards at 306 polling places. All precincts were audited and where the paperwork reflected discrepancies, those discrepancies were thoroughly researched and resolved. In all cases these were poll worker errors such as simple mathematical errors, transcription errors, or recording information in multiple places on the same form (i.e. counting a spoiled surrendered Vote By Mail ballot as both a spoiled ballot and a surrendered Vote By Mail ballot; therefore, recording it as two ballots when only one existed).

1% Manual Tally

Per Elections Code Section 15360, 1% of precincts must be hand tallied to determine that the voting system is reading and tabulating votes correctly. In March 2020, 10 batches of ballots were fully tallied and 5 additional precincts with specific contests that were not included in the initial group of precincts were also tallied.

Batches were randomly selected using a random number generator. All votes cast in those batches were tallied including Vote By Mail, Poll Ballots. Blank ballots that were encountered (in any media) were tallied as undervotes for each contest. Spoiled, cancelled and otherwise invalidated ballots were not tallied as they are not valid ballots.

Vote By Mail and paper ballots used at the polling places were tallied by audit teams of three auditors, and one supervisor. All auditors were grouped around a large table. The ballots were distributed between all the auditors. Each auditor had to reconcile the number of votes cast to the number recorded from the ballots. The tally is kept by a team of two tally-takers. Both the tally-keepers and the caller had to match, and the total had to balance. The results were later compared to the central tally count and if the totals did not match, then the hand tally began again. The tally was concluded when the totals matched or there was a confirmed discrepancy.

Materials used to complete the tallies were minimal, but included specialized tally sheets, pencils, calculators, and the central count reports.

In conclusion, our hand tallies matched the machine output totals with 100% accuracy.

Seals Audit

Each piece of voting equipment is protected under multiple levels of security. One level of security is the visible seals used on the equipment. All visible seals were audited. Where questions arose regarding particular seals, extensive investigations were undertaken. In no case was there any break of security that endangered any votes. All instances of anomalies were traced back to poll worker or staff error such as typographical errors or not returning all the broken seals.